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eBay’s Market Intermediation Problem
Kamal Jain∗ Christopher A. Wilkens†
Abstract
We study the optimal mechanism design problem faced by a market intermediary who makes
revenue by connecting buyers and sellers. We first show that the optimal intermediation protocol
has substantial structure: it is the solution to an algorithmic pricing problem in which seller’s
costs are replaced with virtual costs, and the sellers’ payments need only depend on the buyer’s
behavior and not the buyer’s actual valuation function.
Since the underlying algorithmic pricing problem may be difficult to solve optimally, we
study specific models of buyer behavior and give mechanisms with provable approximation
guarantees. We show that offering only the single most profitable item for sale guarantees an
Ω( 1
log n
) fraction of the optimal revenue when item value distributions are independent and have
monotone hazard rates. We also give constant factor approximations when the buyer considers
all items at once, k items at once, or items in sequence.
1 Introduction
The internet has connected people in ways unfathomable a few decades ago. This newfound ease
of communication has ushered in a new era in commerce, yet, alone the internet is just a tool
— without intermediaries like Google, eBay, and Amazon to help buyers navigate and connect
with sellers, e-commerce would not have flourished. In particular, sites like eBay and Amazon
have established themselves as nexuses connecting buyers and sellers in ways that were impossible
without the internet. This raises a natural design question: given a group of buyers and sellers,
what is the optimal way to intermediate between them? We call this the market intermediation
problem.
Market intermediation is fundamental to e-commerce. First, it solves an informational problem
by connecting buyers and sellers who were not already aware of each other. For example, without
a central portal like Google or eBay, a buyer might only shop at the online stores for sellers he
already knew about offline. Second, an intermediary reduces transaction costs by making the most
appropriate connections between buyers and sellers. Even if buyers knew all the sellers on the
internet, there is a small bargaining cost for a buyer and seller to exchange information about
supply, demand, and prices. The wide variety of buyers and sellers on the internet would make
such costs prohibitively large — an intermediary reduces costs by aggregating information, allowing
buyers and sellers to be matched efficiently.
Our work has roots in the classic economic analysis of bilateral trade and double auctions. In
1983, Myerson and Satterthwaite [12] asked a simple question: will two self-interested people always
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trade when it is beneficial? The intriguing answer — there is no equilibrium in which two parties
trade whenever it is beneficial without the help of an intermediary — derives from constraints on
truthful payments, and their subsequent analysis of “Trading with a Broker” precisely models our
scenario with a single buyer and a single seller. Myerson and Satterthwaite’s result [12] was the
first in a line of research on double auctions (e.g. [10]), where many buyers and sellers place bids on
a single commodity. More recent contributions from computer scientists have considered efficient
algorithms and approximations (e.g. [15, 9, 8]) as well as the effect of a network structure [4]. The
most relevant work to our own is a very recent paper by Deng et al. [8], who give approximation
algorithms for optimizing revenue in Bayesian settings with multiple buyers, sellers, and items.
The market intermediation problem also has roots in the more recent computer science study
of algorithmic pricing: given a collection of items and knowledge of buyer behavior, how should the
items be priced? This basic computational question was first studied by Rusmevichientong et al. [13]
and Aggarwal et al. [1] in a rank-buying model. Subsequent research considered a wide variety of
other models, the most relevant results being Chawla, et al. [6, 7] who gave approximations for the
case of a single unit-demand buyer and Cai and Daskalakis [5] who gave an FPTAS for the same
setting.
The market intermediation problem combines these two research areas: interaction with the
buyer is essentially an algorithmic pricing problem, yet the items for sale are brought by selfish
agents as in double auctions.
Results. We study the market intermediation problem in a setting with a single unit-demand
buyer and a group of n sellers. First, we show that the optimal solution to this problem has substan-
tial structure — it is monotone for the sellers (necessary and sufficient for incentive compatibility),
buyer prices can be reduced to an algorithmic pricing problem in which the intermediary is itself
the seller, and the payments to the sellers need only depend on the costs and likelihood of sale (not
the precise value of the buyer).
The market intermediation problem thus reduces to a computational one: the intermediary
must solve an algorithmic pricing problem to choose the prices the buyer sees and then compute
payments to the sellers. Since the sellers are single-parameter agents, their payments are given by
a straightforward integral expression [11, 2], and even if that integral is impossible to compute we
can use tricks like Archer et al. [3] to maintain truthfulness in expectation. On the other hand, the
optimal prices for the buyer may be more difficult to compute, so we study a variety of efficient
approximation strategies for the intermediary.
The first approximation we consider is the simplest strategy for the intermediary: pick the single
best item and sell it. We show that this guarantees an Ω( 1logn) fraction of the optimal revenue when
the items’ values are drawn from independent, monotone hazard rate distributions.
Next, we consider approximations when the buyer picks his favorite item from a set. When the
buyer considers all items, we adapt the anonymous virtual reserve price of Chawla et al. [7] to give
a 12 -approximation to the optimal revenue.
1 In the more realistic setting where the intermediary
can show the buyer at most k items, the intermediary must choose which k items to show and
then compute prices. Here, the intermediary wants to approximate the optimal revenue that can
be obtained by selling at most k items. We show that an anonymous virtual reserve price can
1A result of Deng et al. [8] implies a weaker 1
4
-approximation in this setting. Their result is technically incomparable
to ours — they study a more general setting when there are multiple buyers who each demand an arbitrary number
of goods, but they make substantially stronger assumptions about the representation of probability distributions.
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be combined with a greedy algorithm to give a e−12e -approximation, provided the intermediary can
estimate the expected maximum value of a set of items (results of Cai and Daskalakis [5] show that
this requirement is nontrivial, as we discuss later).
Finally, we consider a buyer who looks at items in order until he finds one he is willing to buy.
We show that the order is less important than the prices: choosing any ordering and computing
the optimal prices for that order gives a 12 -approximation to the revenue of the optimal cascade.
2 The Market Intermediation Problem
The market intermediation problem models an intermediary connecting a buyer to a group of n
sellers. Each seller i is offering a distinct, indivisible item and faces a privately-known cost of ci ∼ Ci
when a sale is made (e.g. the on-demand manufacturing cost). Sellers report their costs when they
come to the mechanism. We use c to denote the vector of costs and C = C1× · · ·× Cn to denote the
distribution of c. We assume that the distributions for costs are independent and have monotone
hazard rates2 (see Section 2.1).
A unit-demand buyer with type t ∈ T (where T is independent of C) comes to the intermediary
to buy an item. After interacting with the intermediary, the buyer purchases item i with probability
xi(t, c), paying an (expected) price p
B
i (t, c).
The intermediary otherwise has complete control over the interaction between the buyer and
the seller — its goal is to maximize revenue through a truthful protocol, that is, to pay sellers in
such a way that revealing their true costs c is a dominant strategy.
The Independent Values Setting. Our algorithmic results assume the buyer’s valuation is
described by n values vi drawn from independent distributions Vi.
The buyer is generally presented with a set of prices pBi and chooses the item that maximizes
vi − p
B
i ; however, he may not consider all items available. For example, a buyer on eBay may only
consider the first page of search results or may look at items until he finds something he likes. We
discuss specific attention models in Sections 5 and 6.
2.1 Distributions, Hazard Rates, and Virtual Values
We represent distributions with density functions f(z) and cumulative density functions F (z). For
such a distribution F (z), the hazard rate is given by
h(z) =
f(z)
1− F (z)
.
The following identity directly relates F (z) to the hazard rate:
F (z) = 1− e−
∫ z
0 h(x)dx . (1)
A noteworthy distribution is the exponential distribution Eγ(z) = 1 − e
−γz , which has a constant
hazard rate hEγ (z) = γ.
2The monotone hazard rate requirement is applied to the distribution −Ci so as to guarantee that the virtual cost
θCi(ci) is monotone.
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A distribution F is said to have a monotone hazard rate (MHR) if h(z) is non-decreasing. MHR
distributions are convenient because the Myersonian virtual value [11] is monotone. Myerson’s
virtual value φF (v) represents the marginal revenue obtained by selling to a buyer with value
v ∼ F (v):
φF (v) = v −
1
h(v)
= v −
1− F (v)
f(v)
.
For this work, we also define the virtual cost of a seller as
θF (c) = c+
F (c)
f(c)
.
This represents the marginal cost to the intermediary when a seller with cost c makes a sale.
2.2 Optimal Single-Item Mechanisms
We highlight two important classical optimality results. First, Myerson’s optimal auction [11] says
that the optimal way to sell a single item to a single buyer with an MHR distribution is to choose
the price pM satisfying φV(pM ) = 0. When the seller has an outside option ROUT and faces a cost
c, Myerson’s result says that the optimal price η satisfies
η − c−ROUT =
1
hV(η)
.
Myerson and Satterthwaite [12] later considered the case where a selfish player holds the item
(instead of the auctioneer). Their result precisely corresponds to the market intermediation problem
with one seller (n = 1):
Theorem 2.1 (Myerson and Satterwhaite) In the revenue optimal intermediation with a sin-
gle seller and MHR distributions, the buyer purchases the item if and only if φV(v)− θC(c) ≥ 0.
3 Revenue Optimization in the General Setting
In this section, we show that the revenue optimal intermediation scheme has three nontrivial fea-
tures:
1. The revenue optimal scheme is monotone for the sellers. Following classical results for single-
parameter agents [11, 2], this is a necessary and sufficient criterion for seller incentive com-
patability.
2. The prices seen by the bidder pBi can be computed as if the intermediary were the seller and
faced a cost of θCi(ci). This gives a natural reduction from the market intermediation problem
to an algorithmic pricing problem.
3. The payments to the sellers pSi only depend on the costs and purchase decision of the buyer,
not on the exact values v. This implies that the intermediary need not ask the buyer for his
actual value.
Algorithm 1 gives a general mechanism for the market intermediation problem incorporating these
features.
We first prove seller monotonicity:
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ALGORITHM 1: A general mechanism for the market intermediation problem.
1 Solicit costs ci from sellers;
2 Compute virtual costs θCi(ci);
3 Compute a protocol for interacting with the buyer, including what items are shown and at
what prices; // The protocol may be restricted when the buyer’s attentionis
limited.
4 Pay the seller whose item was bought pSi (c); // p
S
i need not depend on the precise
value of the buyer, only on the likelihood of sale.
Theorem 3.1 The revenue optimal instantiation of the general algorithm (Algorithm 1) is mono-
tone for the sellers, i.e. the probability of selling item i is decreasing in ci.
Proof: Suppose T is represented as a probability measure. Define the cost vector c+i as the vector
that increases i’s cost by δ, i.e.
c+ij =
{
cj + δ i = j
cj otherwise.
Consider the optimal intermediation scheme for a type t and cost vector c. Let xi(t, c) denote
the probability that the buyer purchases item i and pBi (t, c) denote the expected price for this
scheme as defined in Section 2.
Since the distribution T is independent of the cost distributions, the buyer’s behavior does not
depend on c. Thus, when the types and costs are t and c respectively, optimality implies that the
intermediary makes more money selling according to xi(t, c) and p
B
i (t, c) than if it acted as if the
cost vector was c+j . Thus:∑
i
∫
xi(t, c)(p
B
i (t, c) − θCi(ci))dT ≥
∑
i
∫
xi(t, c
+j)(pBi (t, c
+j)− θCi(ci))dT .
Likewise, optimality for c+j implies
∑
i
∫
xi(t, c
+j)(pBi (t, c
+j)− θCi(c
+j
i ))dT ≥
∑
i
∫
xi(t, c)(p
B
i (t, c) − θCi(c
+j
i ))dT .
Combining these two and canceling terms gives∫
xj(t, c)(θCj (cj + δ)− θCj (cj))dT ≥
∫
xj(t, c)(θCj (cj + δ) − θCj(cj))dT .
Since the virtual costs are assumed to be monotone, this implies∫
xj(t, c)dT ≥
∫
xi(t, c)dT
as desired.
Given monotonicity, we can apply classical results to compute the revenue and show that the
intermediary’s pricing problem can be formulated as an algorithmic pricing problem with virtual
costs:
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Theorem 3.2 The revenue-optimal intermediation protocol can be described as follows: for each
cost vector c, solve the underlying algorithmic pricing problem for p assuming the cost of item i is
θCi(ci).
Proof: Let xi(t, c) be the probability that the buyer purchases item i and let pit be the probability
that it has type t. From [11, 2] we know that for incentive compatibility the payment of seller i
must be
pSi (t, c) = −cix(t, c)−
∫ ci
0
x(t, c−iu)du .
We can thus write the expected revenue of the mechanism as
E[R] =
∫
fC(c)
∫ ∑
i
(pBi (c)xi(t, c) + p
S
i (t, c))dTdc .
Rearranging in the standard way gives
E[R] =
∫
fC(c)
∫ ∑
i
xi(t, c)(p
B
i (c)− θCi(ci))dTdc .
That is, the revenue of the intermediary is precisely as if he faces a cost of θCi(ci) for item i.
Corollary 3.3 An α approximation to the underlying algorithmic pricing problem without costs
gives an α approximation to the market intermediation problem as long as it is monotone from the
sellers’ perspectives.
Proof: Given the true cost vector c (incentive compatibility is guaranteed by monotonicity), the
virtual costs θCi(ci) are constants. For each item i, we solve the algorithmic pricing problem with
the distribution Vi shifted by θCi(ci). This guarantees an α approximation for every c and thus an
α approximation to the market intermediation problem.
Finally, we show that the intermediary need not explicitly query the buyer’s value:
Theorem 3.4 The revenue optimal instantiation of the general algorithm can be implemented so
that seller payments depend only on costs and which item is bought, not the precise value of the
buyer.
Proof: Suppose truthful payments pSi (t, c) exist. Charge p
S
i (c) = Et∼T [p
S
i (t, c)].
4 Selling the Best Single Item
A simple strategy for the intermediary is to find the single most profitable item and only show
that item to the buyer. This strategy can generally guarantee at most a 1
n
fraction of the optimal
revenue; however, we show that this gives a much better approximation when the value of each
item is independent and drawn from a MHR distribution Vi:
Theorem 4.1 When the buyer’s valuations Vi are independent and MHR, selling the single most
profitable item (based on virtual costs θCi(ci)) in an optimal auction generates at least a
1
e lnn fraction
of the optimal revenue in either the full attention or cascade model.
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To prove Theorem 4.1, we first to show that the benefit from selling an extra item with distri-
bution V in the cascade model is maximized when V is an exponential distribution. We then bound
the approximation for items with exponential distributions.
Suppose a seller wishes to sell a single item to a buyer whose value is drawn from the distribution
V (the seller’s cost is 0). Let RM be the revenue generated by selling the item by itself using
Myerson’s optimal auction, and let pM be the price at which Myerson’s auction sells the item.
Suppose also that the seller has an outside option guaranteeing revenue of ROUT if the item
does not sell. Let RV > RM be the revenue generated by the optimal auction when the seller
considers his outside option, and let ∆RV = RV −ROUT be the optimal incremental revenue, i.e.
the extra benefit to the seller on top of his outside option. Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2 For a fixed value of RM , the incremental revenue ∆RV is maximized when V is an
exponential distribution for any value of ROUT . In particular,
∆RV ≤
1
eγ
e−γROUT
where γ = 1
eRM
.
Proof: First, we identify three distributions:
• V is the true distribution of v as defined in the problem.
• E is the exponential distribution that generates the same revenue as V in Myerson’s optimal
auction. We will see that this is the exponential distribution with γ = 1
eRM
.
• V˜ is a hybrid defined through its hazard rate:
hV˜ =
{
hV(v), v ≤ pM
hV(pM ), otherwise.
(The fact that V˜ is well-defined follows from identity (1).)
Our proof shows that ∆RV ≤ ∆RV˜ ≤ ∆RE .
Preliminaries. For a distribution F , let ηF denote the optimal selling price if we account for
the seller’s outside option. Thus, ηF must satisfy
ηF −ROUT =
1
hF (ηF )
.
The total (optimal) revenue RF generated by F is therefore
RF = (1− F (ηF ))ηF + F (ηF )ROUT .
Thus, the incremental revenue of selling at a fixed price p is
RF (p)−ROUT = (1− F (p))p + F (p)ROUT −ROUT
= (1− F (p))(p −ROUT ) ,
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and the optimal incremental revenue ∆RF is
∆RF = (1− F (ηF ))(ηF −ROUT ) =
1− F (ηF )
hF (ηF )
= RM
1−F (ηF )
1−F (pM )
hF (ηF )
hF (pM )
.
Step 1: ∆RV ≤ ∆RV˜ .
Let z satisfy
1− FV˜(z) = 1− FV(ηV) .
Since hV(v) is assumed to be nondecreasing, the identity (1) implies
1− FV˜(v) = e
−
∫ v
0 hV˜(u)du ≥ e−
∫ v
0 hV(u)du = 1− FV(v) ,
and thus z ≥ ηV because F is nondecreasing. We know that the optimal revenue RV˜ is at least the
revenue generated by selling at price z, so
∆RV˜ ≥ (1− FV˜(z))(z −ROUT )
≥ (1− FV(ηV))(ηV −ROUT ) = ∆RV .
Thus, the incremental revenue from V˜ is at least as large as the incremental revenue from V.
Step 2: ∆RV˜ ≤ ∆RE.
As shown above, the incremental revenue ∆RV˜ is
∆RV˜ = RM
1−F
V˜
(η
V˜
)
1−F
V˜
(pM )
h
V˜
(η
V˜
)
h
V˜
(pM )
= RM
e−(ηV˜−pM )hV(pM )
1
.
By the optimality of ηV˜ and pM as well as the definition of V˜ we know that
ηV˜ −ROUT =
1
hV˜(ηV˜)
=
1
hV(pM )
= pM ,
and so ηV˜ − pM = ROUT . Thus,
∆RV˜ = RMe
−ROUThV(pM ) .
Similar analysis of the exponential distribution E shows that
∆RE = RMe
−ROUT γ .
Thus, to show ∆RE ≥ ∆RV˜ we need only show γ ≤ hV(pM ).
One can check that the optimal revenue of E in the absence of ROUT is
1− FE(
1
γ
)
hE(
1
γ
)
=
1
eγ
.
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Thus, by definition of E we have chosen γ so that RM =
1
eγ
. Using the facts that RM =
1−FV(pM )
hV(pM )
,
hV is nondecreasing, and pM =
1
hV(pM )
we get
hV(pM ) = eγ(1− FV(pM ))
= eγe−
∫ pM
0 hV(v)dv
≥ eγe−pMhV(pM ) = eγe−1 = γ
This gives
∆RV˜ = RMe
−ROUThV(pM ) ≤ RMe
−ROUT γ = ∆RE
as desired.
We can now prove our approximation theorem:
Proof: (of Theorem 4.1) Following Corollary 3.3, it is sufficient to consider the pricing problem of
a single seller without costs. Let ΠOPT be the optimal ordering of items in a cascade. Let Rk be
the revenue if we only sold the last k items, and let ∆Rk = Rk −Rk−1 be the incremental benefit
of being able to sell the kth item. Then by Lemma 4.2 we have
Rk = Rk−1 +∆Rk ≤ Rk−1 +
1
eγk
e−γkRk−1 ≤ Rk−1 +
1
eγmin
e−γminRk−1
where 1
eγk
is the Myersonian revenue of selling item i and γmin is the minimum over all k. We use
induction to prove that Rk ≤
ln k
γmin
.
Base case k = 2:
Rk ≤
1
eγmin
e−
1
e <
ln 2
eγmin
Inductive step:
Rk ≤ Rk−1 +
1
eγmin
e−γminRk−1
=
ln(k − 1)
γmin
+
1
eγmin
e
−γmin
ln(k−1)
γmin
≤
1
γmin
(
ln(k − 1) + ln
(
k
k − 1
))
=
ln k
γmin
Thus, we have
Rn ≤ (e ln n)max
i
RiM
as desired.
Since the optimal revenue from a cascade is an upper bound on the optimal revenue in a full
attention model, this implies a 1
e lnn approximation for the full attention setting as well.
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5 Approximation with (Limited) Full Attention
As noted earlier, buyers often have limited attention — a buyer might only look at the first page
of search results or may scan down a list until he finds an item he is willing to buy. In this section
we use anonymous virtual reserve prices to give approximations when the buyer considers a set of
items and picks his favorite. We first consider full attention model, where the buyer is presented
with a set of prices pBi and buyer considers all possible items, then we consider the more realistic
k-limited attention model where the buyer only looks at k items. In the later case, the intermediary
must choose which k items to show the buyer.
5.1 Full Attention
Chawla et al. [7] show how to compute an anonymous virtual reserve price that guarantees a 12 -
approximation to the algorithmic pricing problem — we show that this gives a 12 -approximation in
the full attention model.
The full attention model is effectively a special case of a double auction. In their very recent
work, Deng et al. [8] give a 14 -approximation in the more general setting with multiple buyers,
each of whom are interested in buying an arbitrary (finite) number of items. This gives a (weaker)
1
4 -approximation in our setting; however, their work also makes substantially stronger assumptions
about the auctioneer’s access to the buyer’s distributions. As such, our result is substantially
stronger for our single-buyer setting.
Theorem 5.1 The 12-approximation of Chawla et al. [7] for the algorithmic pricing problem with
a single unit demand bidder gives a 12-approximation to the market intermediation problem.
Proof: Following Corollary 3.3, we need only show that the approximation of Chawla et al. [7] is
monotone, i.e. the likelihood of the seller purchasing item i is decreasing in ci. Their algorithm
applied to our setting can be described as follows:
1. Let z = maxi φVi(vi), and let Z be the distribution of z when vi ∼ Vi.
2. Let r be the median3 of the distribution Z.
3. Set pBi = φ
−1(r)
Let si = vi−pi be the surplus if the bidder buys item i. Note that the bidder’s decision depends
only on the surpluses and not on the specific values vi and pi.
Let Vδi denote the distribution Vi shifted right by δ. Let p be the price vector given by computing
this approximation with Vi, and let p
δ be the price vector computed from Vδi for all i.
We first show that pδi = pi+ δ and that, consequently, the probability the buyer buys any given
item is the same. By definition of φ, the distribution of φVi(vi) shifts by δ:
φVδi
(vi + δ) = vi + δ −
1
hVi(vi)
= φVi(vi) + δ .
3Chawla, Hartline, Malec, and Sivan [7] study a more general setting in which one cannot simply take r to be the
median; however, the median suffices for our simpler setting [6, 14].
10
It follows that the median of the max distribution must also shift by δ, so rδ = r + δ. Now pδi is
chosen to satisfy
φVδi
(pδi ) = r
δ = r + δ .
Notice that
φVδi
(pi + δ) = φVi(pi) + δ = r + δ ,
so pδi = pi + δ. Thus, both vi and pi increased by δ, so the surpluses remain the same and the
probability that the buyer chooses i is the same under Vi as it is under V
δ
i .
Next, consider shifting only the valuation of item i and selling at the price vector (p−i, pi + δ).
Again, the surpluses remain the same, so the probability that the buyer chooses i is the same as
it was before the shift. However, since the value r increases every time we shift a distribution
to the right, for items j 6= i we know that pj is lower than the price given by the Chawla et al.
approximation. Similarly, we know that pi+ δ is higher than the price at which the approximation
would sell item i. Thus, in every outcome the surplus si is greater under the approximation than
it is under (p−i, pi + δ) while the surpluses sj are smaller. It follows that the likelihood the buyer
chooses item i can only increase, as desired.
5.2 k-Limited Attention
In the k-limited attention model, the intermediary can only show k items to the user (e.g. the first
page of search results). The buyer subsequently chooses the item maximizing vi − p
B
i . We show
that greedily choosing the set of items to show gives a constant-factor approximation.
Implementing the greedy algorithm requires estimating E[maxi∈S vi] for an arbitrary set S.
Doing so efficiently is nontrivial — results of Cai and Daskalakis [5] show that the distribution of
maxi∈S vi may not be sufficiently concentrated to estimate E[maxi∈S vi] from samples for arbitrary
distributions. We leave the problem of estimating E[maxi∈S vi] as an open question.
Conditioned on the intermediary’s ability to estimate E[maxi∈S vi], the greedy algorithm can
be combined with the anonymous virtual reserve construction of Chawla et al. [7] to get a constant-
factor approximation:
Theorem 5.2 Assuming the auctioneer can efficiently estimate Evi∼Vi [maxi∈S φVi(vi)] for any set
S, using a greedy algorithm to select which k items to show and then using the approximation of
Chawla et al. [7] to compute prices gives an e−12e approximation in the k-limited attention model.
Proof: The approximation of Chawla et al. [7] used in Theorem 5.1 guarantees a 12 -approximation
to Evi∼Vi [maxi φVi(vi)], which is the Myersonian revenue if the buyer were split into n competing
buyers (one for each good). This is itself an upper bound on the optimal revenue in the single-buyer
setting.
Thus, if we knew the set S of items (where |S| = k) that maximized the expected virtual
value Evi∼Vi [maxi∈S φVi(vi)], then Theorem 5.1 would imply a
1
2 -approximation here. Instead, we
approximate S using the greedy algorithm. As shown in Lemma 5.4 (below), the greedy algorithm
gives a set S whose expected virtual value is an e−1
e
-approximation to the optimal S, giving an
e−1
2e -approximation to the optimal revenue. The greedy algorithm is monotone from the sellers’
perspective, proving the theorem.
11
It remains to prove that the greedy algorithm gives an e−1
e
-approximation as claimed in Theo-
rem 5.2. This will follow from submodularity.
Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independent random variables, and let S ⊆ [n] represent a subset of the Xi
variables. Then:
Lemma 5.3 The function f(S) = E[maxi∈S Xi] is a monotone submodular set function.
Proof: The function f(S) = maxi∈S Xi is a monotone submodular function, therefore by linearity
of expectation so is f(S) = E[maxi∈S Xi].
The following lemma follows from the standard analysis of the maximum coverage problem:
Lemma 5.4 Suppose we asked to select a set S of size k that maximizes E[maxi∈S Xi]. The greedy
algorithm gives a (1− 1
e
) approximation for this problem.
6 Approximation with Cascading Attention
In the cascading attention model, the intermediary has a set of slots. The buyer looks at slots
according to an order Π and buys the first item for which vi ≥ pi. Knowing this, the intermediary
decides the matching of items to slots and the prices pBi for each item
Theorem 6.1 Given any fixed ordering Π of items, the optimal prices for that ordering generate
at least 12 the revenue of the optimal cascade.
Proof: Define the cumulative revenue Rk under ordering Π as the revenue if we only sold the last
k items, and the incremental revenue ∆Rk is ∆Rk = Rk −Rk−1.
First, we observe that the optimal prices for a given ordering Π can be computed greedily.
Because distributions are independent, the optimal price for item k is simply the optimal single-item
auction price given an outside option ofRk−1. Thus, the optimal prices can be computed recursively
starting with the last item in Π. Lemma 6.2 (below) therefore implies that the incremental revenue
of an item is decreasing in its cumulative revenue.
Now, let z be the smallest value of k such that Rk >
1
2R
OPT in the optimal order ΠOPT . If the
cumulative revenue of this item in Π is at least 12R
OPT , then we are done.
Otherwise, the cumulative revenue of each item k ≥ z in ΠOPT is smaller in Π than it is in
the optimal cascade ΠOPT . This implies that the incremental revenue ∆Rk is greater in Π than it
is in the optimum. However, the total incremental revenue of items k ≥ z is at least 12R
OPT by
construction, so the total revenue of Π must be at least 12R
OPT .
Lemma 6.2 For an optimal single-item auction, the revenue from selling the item ηROUT (1 −
F (ηROUT )) is decreasing in both the outside option ROUT and the total revenue of the auction
ROUT + ηROUT (1− F (ηROUT )).
Proof: Optimality of ηROUT has a few relevant consequences. First, the optimal selling price ηROUT
is increasing in ROUT . Second, combined with monotonicity of ηROUT , optimality of ηROUT implies
that the revenue from selling the item ηROUT (1 − F (ηROUT )) is also decreasing in ROUT . Finally,
the total revenue is increasing in ROUT , so the revenue of selling the item ηROUT (1−F (ηROUT )) is
decreasing in the total revenue.
12
7 Conclusion and Open Questions
The market intermediation problem models a fundamental situation faced by companies like eBay,
Amazon, and Google. Much work in economics and algorithmic game theory is relevant, but little
directly addresses the problems these companies face. Our results show that the intermediary’s
problem has significant structure and offers strategies with provable performance guarantees; how-
ever, it still leaves many open questions:
1. Which existing algorithmic pricing solutions are monotone from the sellers’ perspective?
2. What other value and attention models permit good approximations?
3. Are there ways the intermediary can leverage mechanisms that do not require direct revelation
by the sellers, such as eBay’s commission model?
4. How does the model change with multiple bidders?
5. In practice, what is the best intermediation protocol for a company like eBay?
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